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27m ago

Missouri congressional redistricting battle goes to Supreme Court for the third time

Less than two weeks after the Supreme Court paused a ruling by a federal judge in Missouri that would have cleared the way for the state to use a new congressional map intended to give Republicans an additional seat in the U.S. House of Representatives in the November 2026 elections, the opponents of that map once again asked the justices to intervene in the dispute over the state’s congressional districts. On Tuesday night, challengers to the new map asked the justices to block a decision by a federal appeals court in St. Louis that instructed the state to use it in the November elections. Lawyer Abha Khanna, who represents the challengers, told the court that its orders “are not invitations for a lower court to repackage the same relief and try again.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who initially handles emergency appeals from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, directed the state and the supporters of the new map to respond by 2 p.m. EDT on Wednesday. The challengers’ 39-page filing was the latest chapter in a labyrinthine saga that has already been to the U.S. Supreme Court twice, from two separate – state and federal – court systems. The dispute began last year, when – with President Donald Trump’s encouragement – Missouri adopted a new map. In December, opponents of the state’s new map – including the group People Not Politicians and its executive director, Richard von Glahn – submitted more than 300,000 signatures in support of a petition to put the new map up for a vote in November 2026. Missouri’s top election official, Secretary of State Denny Hoskins, rejected the petition on Aug. 4, 2026 – the last day to do so – and Missouri conducted its August primary with the new map. Von Glahn went immediately to state court, asking it to reverse Hoskins’ decision and block Missouri from using the new map. On Sept. 3, the Missouri Supreme Court unanimously granted that request. It concluded that, under the state’s constitution, the referendum petition “was legal, sufficient, and timely.” As a result, it wrote, the new map never went into effect and will not do so “unless and until approved by the voters at the November 2026 general election.” The Missouri Supreme Court rejected as “wholly unpersuasive” Hoskins’ argument that the failure to use the new map would lead to “confusion, expense, and practical difficulties.” “[T]hese arguments are particularly misplaced” when Hoskins failed to act on the petition until August, leading to the problems, the court suggested. Hoskins went to the Supreme Court on Sept. 4, asking the justices to intervene. Kavanaugh denied that request four days later without referring it to the full court. While Hoskins was seeking relief from the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling in the U.S. Supreme Court, Rep. Robert Onder, a Republican who won the Republican nomination for the state’s 3rd congressional district in the August 2026 primary, as well as another congressional candidate and two individual voters, went to federal court, seeking to reinstate the 2025 map. Onder and the other candidate – Richard Brattin, who won the Republican nomination for the state’s 5th congressional district in August – contended that if the November elections go forward using the 2022 map, their districts would be significantly different from the districts in which they won the nominations in August. The individual voters contended that they would vote in a different district in November under the 2022 map than they had in August. Shortly after Kavanaugh’s order denying Hoskins’ request was released, Chief U.S. District Judge Stephen Clark issued a temporary restraining order that directed the state to use the 2025 map. Clark acknowledged that “[c]onducting state elections in accordance with the Missouri Constitution undoubtedly qualifies as an important interest.” But, he concluded, the challengers in the federal case “face irreparable harm” without a temporary restraining order “because many Missouri voters would have to cast their general-election votes for candidates whom they had no role in nominating.” After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit declined to pause Clark’s order, von Glahn and People Not Politicians asked the justices to step in. They told the court that Clark’s order “requires Missouri to conduct its congressional election using a map that, under the authoritative decision of Missouri’s highest court, ‘is not the law and has never been the law.’” Moreover, they added, election officials in Missouri had indicated that the election in November could be conducted using the 2022 map. Hoskins urged the justices to leave Clark’s order in place, telling them that putting it on hold “would change Missouri’s congressional map for a third time in a week—and … would come after the state-law deadline to alter ballots and just nine days before the federal-law deadline to send out military and overseas ballots.” Indeed, he noted, “county election officials have already started printing ballots in compliance with” Clark’s order. But within minutes after Hoskins filed his brief opposing a stay on Sept. 10, the Supreme Court – in a brief, unsigned order – granted the request by von Glahn and People Not Politicians to block Clark’s order. It stated that Clark’s order would remain on hold “pending the disposition of the appeal in and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, if such a writ is timely sought.” The 8th Circuit, which fast-tracked the proceedings, heard oral arguments on Sept. 17, and issued its decision on Monday. In an unsigned, 35-page opinion , the 8th Circuit held “that Missouri’s current plan to use the 2022 map in the November 2026 general election violates the Constitution. Only use of the 2025 map complies with the Constitution and federal law.” In particular, the court of appeals said, because the state used the 2025 map in the August primaries, using a different map in the November general election would violate Article I, § 2 of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States”: among other things, voters who, as a result of the change in maps, did not have an opportunity “to vote for the nominees that will appear on their November 2026 general election ballot” are “deprive[d] … of their constitutional right of choice.” According to the court of appeals, the Purcell principle – the idea that federal courts should not change election rules too close to an election – “supports, not prevents” a ruling in favor of Onder and the other plaintiffs. “Using the 2025 map … will lead to the least amount of confusion for voters subjected to a string of changes this month,” the court of appeals wrote. And in any event, the court continued, “[a]ny confusion stems from the last-minute decision by a state court to switch the congressional map.” The 8th Circuit instructed the district court to enter a permanent order requiring the state to use the 2025 map, but also to put that order on hold until 5 p.m. CDT on Sept. 28 to give the Supreme Court time to weigh in. People Not Politicians and von Glahn returned to the court late Tuesday night, asking the justices either to “clarify” that their Sept. 10 order “means what it says” or pause the 8th Circuit’s Monday ruling. The Supreme Court’s Sept. 10 order, they wrote, froze Clark’s order – which had barred the state from using any map other than the 2025 map – “‘pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court , if such a writ is timely sought.’” That order, they said, is still in effect, because the court “has not adjudicated a petition for certiorari and the time for seeking certiorari has not yet expired.” They stressed that – as election officials across the state have stated – it is too late to return to the 2025 map. Ballots have already been sent to military and overseas voters, and Sept. 22 was the deadline for election officials to “print and make available absentee ballots.” Indeed, they noted, von Glahn himself had already “cast his ballot for the November general election” on Tuesday, “using a ballot issued under the 2022 map.” “That is the electoral disorder Purcell exists to prevent—on steroids,” they contended. Moreover, the challengers continued, the 8th Circuit’s ruling is doubly flawed. First, it “requires Missouri to conduct the election under a map its own Supreme Court has held ‘is not the law and has never been the law’” – thereby creating “conflicting judicial commands” for state officials. Second, it “identifies from whole cloth a right under Article I, Section II that no federal court has recognized: a right to vote for the same candidates within the same constituency at successive stages of an election, even when state law prohibits that result.” Voters like von Glahn, who have already cast their ballots or will do so before Sept. 28, the challengers wrote, will suffer permanent harm if the 8th Circuit’s decision is not put on hold. “At best, their already-cast votes would get thrown out and they would be forced to cast another ballot in the November general election under new district lines. At worst, those voters will be precluded from voting at all in the general election.”

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Missouri congressional redistricting battle goes to Supreme Court for the third time

Less than two weeks after the Supreme Court paused a ruling by a federal judge in Missouri that would have cleared the way for the state to use a new congressional map intended to give Republicans an additional seat in the U.S. House of Representatives in the November 2026 elections, the opponents of that map once again asked the justices to intervene in the dispute over the state’s congressional districts. On Tuesday night, challengers to the new map asked the justices to block a decision by a federal appeals court in St. Louis that instructed the state to use it in the November elections. Lawyer Abha Khanna, who represents the challengers, told the court that its orders “are not invitations for a lower court to repackage the same relief and try again.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who initially handles emergency appeals from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, directed the state and the supporters of the new map to respond by 2 p.m. EDT on Wednesday. The challengers’ 39-page filing was the latest chapter in a labyrinthine saga that has already been to the U.S. Supreme Court twice, from two separate – state and federal – court systems. The dispute began last year, when – with President Donald Trump’s encouragement – Missouri adopted a new map. In December, opponents of the state’s new map – including the group People Not Politicians and its executive director, Richard von Glahn – submitted more than 300,000 signatures in support of a petition to put the new map up for a vote in November 2026. Missouri’s top election official, Secretary of State Denny Hoskins, rejected the petition on Aug. 4, 2026 – the last day to do so – and Missouri conducted its August primary with the new map. Von Glahn went immediately to state court, asking it to reverse Hoskins’ decision and block Missouri from using the new map. On Sept. 3, the Missouri Supreme Court unanimously granted that request. It concluded that, under the state’s constitution, the referendum petition “was legal, sufficient, and timely.” As a result, it wrote, the new map never went into effect and will not do so “unless and until approved by the voters at the November 2026 general election.” The Missouri Supreme Court rejected as “wholly unpersuasive” Hoskins’ argument that the failure to use the new map would lead to “confusion, expense, and practical difficulties.” “[T]hese arguments are particularly misplaced” when Hoskins failed to act on the petition until August, leading to the problems, the court suggested. Hoskins went to the Supreme Court on Sept. 4, asking the justices to intervene. Kavanaugh denied that request four days later without referring it to the full court. While Hoskins was seeking relief from the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling in the U.S. Supreme Court, Rep. Robert Onder, a Republican who won the Republican nomination for the state’s 3rd congressional district in the August 2026 primary, as well as another congressional candidate and two individual voters, went to federal court, seeking to reinstate the 2025 map. Onder and the other candidate – Richard Brattin, who won the Republican nomination for the state’s 5th congressional district in August – contended that if the November elections go forward using the 2022 map, their districts would be significantly different from the districts in which they won the nominations in August. The individual voters contended that they would vote in a different district in November under the 2022 map than they had in August. Shortly after Kavanaugh’s order denying Hoskins’ request was released, Chief U.S. District Judge Stephen Clark issued a temporary restraining order that directed the state to use the 2025 map. Clark acknowledged that “[c]onducting state elections in accordance with the Missouri Constitution undoubtedly qualifies as an important interest.” But, he concluded, the challengers in the federal case “face irreparable harm” without a temporary restraining order “because many Missouri voters would have to cast their general-election votes for candidates whom they had no role in nominating.” After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit declined to pause Clark’s order, von Glahn and People Not Politicians asked the justices to step in. They told the court that Clark’s order “requires Missouri to conduct its congressional election using a map that, under the authoritative decision of Missouri’s highest court, ‘is not the law and has never been the law.’” Moreover, they added, election officials in Missouri had indicated that the election in November could be conducted using the 2022 map. Hoskins urged the justices to leave Clark’s order in place, telling them that putting it on hold “would change Missouri’s congressional map for a third time in a week—and … would come after the state-law deadline to alter ballots and just nine days before the federal-law deadline to send out military and overseas ballots.” Indeed, he noted, “county election officials have already started printing ballots in compliance with” Clark’s order. But within minutes after Hoskins filed his brief opposing a stay on Sept. 10, the Supreme Court – in a brief, unsigned order – granted the request by von Glahn and People Not Politicians to block Clark’s order. It stated that Clark’s order would remain on hold “pending the disposition of the appeal in and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, if such a writ is timely sought.” The 8th Circuit, which fast-tracked the proceedings, heard oral arguments on Sept. 17, and issued its decision on Monday. In an unsigned, 35-page opinion , the 8th Circuit held “that Missouri’s current plan to use the 2022 map in the November 2026 general election violates the Constitution. Only use of the 2025 map complies with the Constitution and federal law.” In particular, the court of appeals said, because the state used the 2025 map in the August primaries, using a different map in the November general election would violate Article I, § 2 of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States”: among other things, voters who, as a result of the change in maps, did not have an opportunity “to vote for the nominees that will appear on their November 2026 general election ballot” are “deprive[d] … of their constitutional right of choice.” According to the court of appeals, the Purcell principle – the idea that federal courts should not change election rules too close to an election – “supports, not prevents” a ruling in favor of Onder and the other plaintiffs. “Using the 2025 map … will lead to the least amount of confusion for voters subjected to a string of changes this month,” the court of appeals wrote. And in any event, the court continued, “[a]ny confusion stems from the last-minute decision by a state court to switch the congressional map.” The 8th Circuit instructed the district court to enter a permanent order requiring the state to use the 2025 map, but also to put that order on hold until 5 p.m. CDT on Sept. 28 to give the Supreme Court time to weigh in. People Not Politicians and von Glahn returned to the court late Tuesday night, asking the justices either to “clarify” that their Sept. 10 order “means what it says” or pause the 8th Circuit’s Monday ruling. The Supreme Court’s Sept. 10 order, they wrote, froze Clark’s order – which had barred the state from using any map other than the 2025 map – “‘pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court , if such a writ is timely sought.’” That order, they said, is still in effect, because the court “has not adjudicated a petition for certiorari and the time for seeking certiorari has not yet expired.” They stressed that – as election officials across the state have stated – it is too late to return to the 2025 map. Ballots have already been sent to military and overseas voters, and Sept. 22 was the deadline for election officials to “print and make available absentee ballots.” Indeed, they noted, von Glahn himself had already “cast his ballot for the November general election” on Tuesday, “using a ballot issued under the 2022 map.” “That is the electoral disorder Purcell exists to prevent—on steroids,” they contended. Moreover, the challengers continued, the 8th Circuit’s ruling is doubly flawed. First, it “requires Missouri to conduct the election under a map its own Supreme Court has held ‘is not the law and has never been the law’” – thereby creating “conflicting judicial commands” for state officials. Second, it “identifies from whole cloth a right under Article I, Section II that no federal court has recognized: a right to vote for the same candidates within the same constituency at successive stages of an election, even when state law prohibits that result.” Voters like von Glahn, who have already cast their ballots or will do so before Sept. 28, the challengers wrote, will suffer permanent harm if the 8th Circuit’s decision is not put on hold. “At best, their already-cast votes would get thrown out and they would be forced to cast another ballot in the November general election under new district lines. At worst, those voters will be precluded from voting at all in the general election.”

SCOTUSblogSCOTUSblogAmy Howe27m ago
  • neutral toward Supreme Court · 97%

Missouri redistricting fight reaches Supreme Court for third time

The messy legal fight over Missouri’s congressional map reached the Supreme Court for a third time in as many weeks late Tuesday as the parties battle less than 50 days before November’s elections over whether the GOP can implement its new boundaries.  Twice before, the nation’s high court has ruled against the GOP, forcing the state…

The HillThe HillZach Schonfeld2h ago
  • neutral toward Supreme Court · 96%

Kagan steers Supreme Court clear of high-profile surrogacy fight

Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan declined a surrogate’s emergency bid on Tuesday to intervene in her custody fight that drew national attention after the biological parents’ told her to get an abortion and she left for Texas instead.  McKenna West, the surrogate, sought to lift a parentage judgment in favor of the couple issued in a California…

The HillThe HillZach Schonfeld14h ago
  • neutral toward Supreme Court · 98%

Senate Democrats press Trump administration on consumer refunds after tariff ruling

A group of Senate Democrats, joined by independent Sen. Bernie Sanders (Vt.), are pressing U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer over tariffs refunds following a Supreme Court decision earlier this year that ruled certain Trump administration tariffs were illegal. The letter, signed by Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.),…

The HillThe HillMira Bhakta21h ago
  • neutral toward Senate · 97%

The Supreme Court refuses to become partisan in two fights over the midterms

People complain that the current Supreme Court is a partisan institution, with the six Republican appointees deciding cases based on their partisan beliefs. But two recent and significant cases on the court’s emergency docket refute that complaint, or at least the most simplistic version of it. The two cases are, first, the fight over Missouri’s congressional map and, second, the suit to stop implementation of the U.S. Postal Service’s rule, adopted at President Donald Trump’s direction, to block the delivery to voters of vote-by-mail ballots unless they appeared on a list provided by their home state’s election officials. In both cases, the court foiled what Republicans – and specifically the Trump administration – wanted. In both cases, the court’s fidelity to nonpartisan enforcement of the law prevailed over the position that the Republican litigants urged the court to take. Let’s consider the Missouri case first. It’s technically two separate Supreme Court proceedings, one from the state’s supreme court and the other from the lower federal courts within the state. But in both proceedings the court prevented Republicans from getting the gerrymandered congressional map they wanted for this year’s midterm general election in November. (After this essay was written, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit issued a subsequent ruling in favor of the gerrymandered map, which will require the matter to return to the Supreme Court for yet a third time. But nothing in the 8th Circuit’s new ruling negates what this essay says about the Supreme Court’s avoidance of partisanship in its handling of the dispute.) Here’s what transpired. After Trump called upon red states (those dominated by Republicans) to gerrymander their congressional maps this year, rather than waiting for the new decennial census as usually occurs, Missouri’s legislation heeded Trump’s wishes and drew a new map that eliminates the state’s majority-Democrat district based in Kansas City. That left the state with only one majority-Democrat district, located in St. Louis. Opponents of the new map, a group called People Not Politicians, gathered enough signatures to put to the state’s voters in a referendum whether the new map should, or should not, take effect. Under Missouri law, once the secretary of state determines that enough signatures have been gathered to add the referendum to the ballot in the next election, the map is blocked from use unless and until the voters approve it in the referendum. PNP submitted their signatures to the secretary of state on Dec. 9 of last year. Missouri’s secretary of state, Denny Hoskins, then waited almost eight months – until Aug. 4 of this year (the last possible date under state law) – to reject the submission of signatures, not because there weren’t enough of them (there were plenty), but instead on the spurious ground that redistricting maps couldn’t be the subject of a referendum under the state’s constitution. The effect of Hoskins’ intentional delay, which was entirely unnecessary, was to cause the state’s congressional primaries to be held based on the new gerrymandered map, the one without the previously existing majority-Democrat district in Kansas City. Meanwhile, PNP sued Hoskins in state court, claiming that his rejection of their referendum submission violated the Missouri constitution, which contained no language that precluded redistricting maps from being subject to a referendum. On Sept. 3, the Missouri Supreme Court unanimously agreed with PNP and refuted Hoskins’ contrary position, ordering him to put the referendum on the November general election ballot. This decree had the effect of nullifying the new map, unless and until approved in the referendum. Indeed, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that the new map never lawfully took effect in the state, because PNP had properly submitted enough signatures, and therefore the new map shouldn’t have been used for the primaries. Although the Missouri Supreme Court didn’t say what to do about the fact that the new map had been wrongly used in the primaries, it made clear that the old map – the one with the existing Democrat-majority district in Kansas City – needed to be used for this year’s November general election. Admittedly, the situation was a mess: The candidates who had won the primaries had won in districts that now did not exist for the general election. But it was a mess of the secretary of state’s own making. Had he rejected PNP’s referendum petition earlier, as he could have right away since his position didn’t involve counting or verifying any signatures, he could have enabled the Missouri Supreme Court to issue its decision long before the primaries, and thus the same old map could have been used for both the primaries and the general election this year. Nonetheless, the secretary of state took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, joined by the Republican Party (represented by the influential law firm Jones Day). They argued that the Missouri Supreme Court had violated Article I, § 4 of the federal Constitution by depriving the state’s legislature of the power to draw the state’s congressional districts. That section states: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.” Their claim was that, by permitting the referendum to suspend the new map, the state’s constitution as interpreted by its highest court had taken the power to draw the map away from the legislature. This claim was especially weak because the Supreme Court only three years ago, in 2023’s Moore v. Harper , had confirmed the validity of a century-old precedent, Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant , which had upheld the power of a state to submit for approval or disapproval in a referendum a congressional map adopted by the state’s legislature. Hoskins and the Republican Party had a second argument that at least was not foreclosed by precedent. This second claim was that using different districts for the primaries and general election violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment because some voters were able to vote for the same candidates in the primaries and the general election (those who had not been affected by the new map’s gerrymander) while some were not (those whose districts changed because of the gerrymander). Given the murkiness of the equal protection clause’s applicability in the context of elections ever since Bush v. Gore (because the court there condemned “arbitrary” differences without explaining what that meant or how its asserted principle would apply in future cases), there was at least some superficial plausibility to this claim of unconstitutionally different treatment. The difficulty with this claim, apart from, again, the fact that there wouldn’t have been any problem if Hoskins had acted properly, was that general election voters don’t have any constitutional right to have primary elections conducted in any particular way –or even to have any primary elections at all. Political parties can nominate their candidates for the general election ballot by means of a convention or caucus, rather than a primary, without violating the Constitution. And there are often voters who participate in a general election who had no opportunity to participate in the primaries that determined the candidates on the general election ballot: for example, those who moved into the district after the primaries but before the general election. Thus, while it was unfortunate that this year in Missouri the primaries were held using one map to determine the nominees for each congressional seat, while the general election will be held using a somewhat different map, this fact does not deny any general election voter an equal right to participate in the general election. Hoskins and the Republican Party submitted their claims to Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the circuit justice for Missouri. He rejected them in a one-line order, without even referring them to the full court. He evidently thought there was no basis for blocking the Missouri Supreme Court’s unanimous decision interpreting the state’s constitution to permit the referendum and thus preclude the use of the legislature’s new map for the general election. One would have thought Kavanaugh’s order would have ended the matter, but Hoskins and his Republican allies refused to take no for an answer. They reasserted their claims in federal district court, where they secured a temporary restraining order requiring the use of the new gerrymandered map for the November general election. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit refused to stay the TRO, but the Supreme Court quickly did. This time Kavanaugh did refer the matter to the full court, but the court was equally terse as Kavanaugh had been, providing no explanation for its ruling. Still, it’s not difficult to surmise that the other justices – there were no noted dissents – concluded that Kavanaugh had been correct initially and that the challenge to the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision had been meritless, and thus there was no valid basis for the federal district court to issue a conflicting order. The court clearly did not act in a partisan fashion in its disposition of the Missouri matter. And the partisan nature of the litigation could not have been more transparent. Not only was this a case of Republicans on one side and Democrats on the other (PNP was represented in the Supreme Court by the Elias Law Group, the leading law firm for the Democratic Party), but Trump’s solicitor general filed an amicus brief to support the use of the Republican gerrymandered map in the general election. Yet none of the court’s justices were willing to publicly support that position. The Supreme Court also rejected the SG’s position in the vote-by-mail case, a matter of much greater concern to Trump himself. At the end of March, Trump issued an executive order requiring the Postal Service to promulgate a rule that would prevent the mailing of absentee ballots to voters who did not appear on a list of entitled recipients. The Postal Service complied (although the details of its rule differed from what Trump had ordered in some respects). The key feature of the Postal Service’s new rule is its requirements that states provide it with a list of all the state’s voters eligible to receive an absentee ballot. The Postal Service will not mail an absentee ballot to any voter not on the state’s list. The new rule was quickly the subject of a preliminary injunction for being beyond the scope of the Postal Service’s authority. There is no act of Congress that explicitly gives the Postal Service the power to screen the delivery of absentee ballots in this way. To be sure, the Postal Service is entitled to regulate what must appear on an absentee ballot envelope for that envelope to be delivered to its addressee. Indeed, some other aspects of the new rule do just that, and they should not be viewed as substantively problematic (although the timing of them in connection with this year’s midterms raised significant issues of feasibility). But it is an altogether different matter for the Postal Service to say that it will not deliver a properly addressed envelope to its addressee unless the addressee’s name appears on a separate list of individuals entitled to receive the mailing. This type of requirement is all the more astonishing in the context of absentee ballots. It is not the job of the Postal Service to police who is entitled to receive an absentee ballot. That’s the job of state and local election officials. And although the Postal Service’s new rule does not second-guess whatever list of entitled voters a state sends it, the rule still requires that it screen all outbound absentee ballots that a state mails to voters to make sure that the recipients are on the state’s submitted list. It’s hard to imagine a more appropriate application of the so-called “major questions doctrine” than this assertion of an electoral gatekeeping function by the Postal Service. That doctrine, which played a significant role in the tariffs case , is an elaboration of Justice Antonin Scalia’s essential insight that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.” In other words, big deal policy innovations cannot be derived by federal executive branch agencies from generic statutory provisions but instead require separate specific and explicit grants of authority from Congress. It certainly would be a gargantuan transformation of the way elections are conducted in the United States for the Postal Service to take on the gatekeeping role that it asserted for itself in its new rule. While Congress could give the Postal Service this power, it most assuredly has not, and fidelity to the underlying principle of the major questions doctrine requires preventing the Postal Service from exercising this electoral authority unless and until Congress enacts a new statute specifically and expressly granting it this power. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit stated when refusing to block the preliminary injunction of the new rule, “Congress historically has been explicit in its exercise of authority under the Elections Clause when it seeks to displace the background assumption that the States will act as the primary regulator of elections.” Yet, as the 1st Circuit observed, that’s not the situation here: “The general authority on which appellants rely here is far removed from that sort of specific congressional action.” Consequently, quoting one of the court’s leading major-question-doctrine decisions, Biden v. Nebraska , the 1st Circuit declared: “Appellants have not convinced us that it is likely that Congress would delegate constitutionally assigned tasks relevant to maintaining our electoral system to the Postal Service through the ‘wafer-thin reed’ of a general grant of authority to manage the postal system.” Like the 1st Circuit, the Supreme Court refused to let the new rule take effect for this year’s election. The court did not issue an opinion. Instead, it succinctly stated: “The Government is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its challenge to the District Court’s preliminary injunction.” Presumably, a majority of the justices see the merits in much the same way as the 1st Circuit did. The court also stated that “the equitable factors applicable for obtaining emergency relief from this Court do not favor a stay.” (Disclosure: I participated in an amicus brief making this point about the balancing of the equities in the context of this year’s midterms.) Kavanaugh wrote separately to say that he agreed with the court that the rule cannot be implemented this year, but he believed there to be “at least a fair prospect” the rule “falls within the Postal Service’s statutory authority.” I hope that Kavanaugh, in saying this, was focused on the portions of the rule that concern the envelope in which absentee ballots are transmitted through the mails. If so, I agree with him. But, for reasons already stated, it would be shocking if Kavanaugh believed that the major questions doctrine would permit the Postal Service to adopt the requirement that a voter be on a list provided to the Postal Service from the voter’s state in order for the Postal Service to deliver that voter an absentee ballot mailed by the state to the voter. More disturbing was the dissent written by Justice Samuel Alito and joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. They would have let the rule take effect immediately, in the midst of this year’s election for which absentee voting has already begun in some states, although it would have been impossible for states to comply with the rule because the Postal Service had not yet established the “portal” into which the states were required to submit their list of voters. In balancing the equities, Alito and Thomas “blame[d]” the states for how they litigated their challenge to the Postal Service’s authority to promulgate its new rule. The states sued when Trump issued his executive order, rather than waiting for the postal rule itself. Even if the states deserve blame for suing too soon – and they do not, given the court’s own Purcell doctrine about the timing of election-related litigation, which encourages such suits to be filed sooner rather than later (see, for example, the court’s decision in Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections from earlier this year) – the voters who would be harmed by enforcement of the rule had nothing to do with the timing of the states’ suit. Indeed, Alito and Thomas express no concern whatsoever for the voters unable to receive the absentee ballots their state has mailed to them because the Postal Service refuses to deliver that mail when the “portal” does not yet exist and it is impossible for the states to comply with the new rule. Regrettably, the position of Alito and Thomas in this case I think is best understood as an exercise of partisanship, to support Trump in his effort to alter the electoral process for the benefit of Republican candidates, although Congress has granted him no such power. Thankfully, none of the other justices engaged in this partisanship. On the contrary, the rest of the court – including Kavanaugh – made clear that the law constrains the president, along with the rest of the executive branch, when it comes to the procedures for conducting elections. This is an extremely welcome message from the court as this year’s voting is now underway.

SCOTUSblogSCOTUSblogEdward Foley23h ago
  • favorable toward The Supreme Court · 94%

Appeals court rules in favor of Trump-backed Missouri congressional maps

Supreme court, which has twice blocked maps from being used in November, likely to have final say in legal fight A long-running legal fight over Missouri’s congressional map took another turn Monday when a federal appeals panel ruled in favor of new districts backed by Donald Trump, even though the US supreme court has blocked those districts from being used in the November election. A three-judge panel of the 8th US circuit court of appeals said Missouri should use the new Republican-drawn US House districts in the November election, just as the state did in its August primary. To revert to its prior districts for the general election would violate the US constitution, the appeals judges said. Continue reading...

The GuardianThe GuardianAssociated Press21 Sept
  • neutral toward Donald Trump · 95%

Both parties embrace Supreme Court spending limit ruling in midterm home stretch

Both parties are embracing the Supreme Court’s summer ruling that allows parties to coordinate and spend unlimited amounts of money with campaigns as marquee midterm races head into the home stretch.  The Senate Republicans’ campaign arm is spending more than $45 million in coordinated expenditures with candidates, according to a campaign report filed Sunday.  …

The HillThe HillCaroline Vakil21 Sept
  • neutral toward Supreme Court · 98%

The “born free and equal” clauses, incorporation, and 12-person juries

This is the sixth of seven introductory articles on the relevance for constitutional law and the Supreme Court of the “born free and equal” clauses, which appeared in the Declaration of Independence and in six out of 12 state constitutions when the federal Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, in 24 out of 37 state constitutions when the 14th Amendment was ratified in 1868, and which is in 37 out of 50 state constitutions today. The “born free and equal” clause of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, for example, provided that : Article I. All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. In my initial articles, I showed that the “born free and equal” idea is deeply rooted in American history and tradition, and applied this clause within the context of same-sex marriage and eugenics laws, among other major Supreme Court precedents. Today, I want to turn to the court’s incorporation of the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights and argue that they should all be fully incorporated – that is, applied to the states – which the Supreme Court has not yet done. I will also argue that the court in Kian v. Florida , which it is hearing this coming term, should hold that state criminal defendants are entitled to a 12-person criminal jury trial and not a six-person one, as prior precedent wrongly allows for. Likewise, the court should overturn its 1916 decision in Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis and incorporate the Seventh Amendment’s right to a civil jury trial to apply against the states. *** In 2010’s McDonald v. City of Chicago , the court held the Second Amendment right to own a gun in one’s home was deeply rooted in American history and tradition, thus meriting incorporation. Specifically, the court correctly reasoned that because 22 out of 37 states in 1868 and 59% of the states in 1868 (when the 14th Amendment was ratified) had Second Amendment analogues, the right to own a gun in one’s home was an enduring one. Based on McDonald , I use 22 states as a benchmark for incorporation and show that 22 or more states in 1868 recognized an analogue to almost all of the rights in the federal bill of rights (these numbers are further detailed here ). The entire First Amendment was deeply rooted in American history and tradition in 1868. As of that year, 27 out of 37 states forbade an establishment of religion in their state bills of rights and all 37 states forbade state laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion; 32 of 37 states forbade laws abridging freedom of speech, and all 37 forbade laws abridging freedom of the press; 34 states out 37 forbade limits on the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances; and 36 out of 37 guaranteed the right to assemble. The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, as mentioned above, was protected by 22 out of 37 state bills of rights in 1868. The Third Amendment right not to have soldiers quartered in one’s house was protected by 26 out of 37 states in 1868. The Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures was protected by 36 out of 37 states in 1868, and 36 out 37 states in 1868 also had rules, as the Fourth Amendment does, as to the lawful issuance of warrants. The Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy was recognized by 31 out of 37 states in 1868; 34 out of 37 states in 1868 guaranteed a right against self-incrimination; 32 out of 37 states guaranteed a right to confront the witnesses against you in 1868; 35 out of 37 states had due process of law clauses; and 33 out 37 state bills of rights had taking clause analogues in 1868. The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in criminal cases was protected in all 37 states in 1868. The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases was protected in 1868 by 36 out of 37 state bills of rights. And the Eighth Amendment protection against excessive bail was protected in 36 of 37 state bills of rights in 1868; the protection against excessive fines existed in 35 out of 37 states as of that year; and the protection from cruel and unusual punishments was recognized in 34 out of 37 states. Given this, it is clear as a bell that the entire federal Bill of Rights – except for the right to indictment by a grand jury – was deeply rooted in American history and tradition, as expressed in the state bills of rights in 1868 when the 14th Amendment was ratified. The legislative history of the 14th Amendment (as argued by fellow SCOTUSblog columnist Akhil Amar) also supports complete incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Senator Jacob Howard, who reported the 14th Amendment’s text to the Senate on behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction said the following: It would be a curious question to solve what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of each of the States in the several States. I do not propose to go at any length into that question at this time. … But we may gather some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary by returning to a case adjudged many years ago in one of the circuit courts of the United States by Judge Bushrod Washington of the Supreme Court; and I will trouble the Senate but for a moment by reading what the very learned and excellent judge says about these privileges and immunities of the citizens of each State in the several States. It is the case of Corfield v. Coryell. Judge Washington says: … Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the section of the fourth article of the Constitution. To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these should be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution … It is high time for the court to also adopt this understanding. *** This all brings us to Kian v. Florida . In the 1970 case of Williams v. Florida , the Supreme Court allowed for six-person rather than 12-person juries in state criminal cases. I think the word “jury” is a legal term of art that means 12 people by definition – and this was historically understood as such. Thus, Noah Webster’s 1828 online Dictionary of American English, which the ratifiers of the 14th Amendment would have used, defines “jury” as follows: JU'RY , noun [Latin juro, to swear.] A number of freeholders, selected in the manner prescribed by law, empaneled and sworn to inquire into and try any matter of fact, and to declare the truth on the evidence given them in the case. Grand juries consist usually of twenty four freeholders at least, and are summoned to try matters alleged in indictments. Petty juries, consisting usually of twelve men , attend courts to try matters of fact in civil causes, and to decide both the law and the fact in criminal prosecutions. The decision of a petty jury is called a verdict. Samuel Johnson’s Online Dictionary of English defines “jury” in the same way: JU’RY , n.s. [jurata, Lat, jure, Fr.] Jury, a company of men, as twenty-four, or twelve, sworn to deliver a truth upon such evidence as shall be delivered them touching the matter in question. The ratifiers of the federal Bill of Rights would then have understood that a jury of 24 persons was required to indict a person, while a jury of 12 persons, not six, was required by the Sixth Amendment to try a person. (Amar also explains this in his splendid amicus brief in Kian v. Flordia .) Similarly, a jury of 12 would have been required in all civil cases at common law under the Seventh Amendment. As Justice Neil Gorsuch said in a statement respecting the denial of review in Thomas v. Humboldt County, California : The right to a civil jury trial remained so deeply rooted that perhaps 97% of Americans at the time lived in States that guaranteed the right. See S. Calabresi & S. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868, 87 Texas L. Rev. 7, 116 (2008). In fact, the civil jury trial right may have enjoyed even more robust protection in American States than various other rights this Court has deemed fit for incorporation. See Timbs , 586 U. S., at 152 (35 out of 37 States expressly forbade excessive fines at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption); McDonald , 561 U. S., at 777 (22 of the 37 States “explicitly protected the right to keep and bear arms” in 1868). Justice Gorsuch is correct. The Seventh Amendment should be incorporated to apply against the states through the 14th Amendment. In a properly presented case, the Supreme Court should grant review on this question and, as with regard to juries fewer than 12 persons, correct this historical injustice.

SCOTUSblogSCOTUSblogSteven Gow Calabresi21 Sept
S

The fundamental confusions of federal Indian law

I wanted to begin this series for SCOTUSblog by discussing some fundamentals (and fundamental confusions) of federal Indian law. Despite the common understanding that federal Indian law is difficult and confounding , I teach my students that its foundational principles are actually fairly simple. Federal law is supreme in Indian affairs, preempting state law ( Washington v. Cougar Den ). Tribal nations (or “Indian tribes,” to use the parlance of the Constitution) are sovereign governments ( United States v. Lara ). The judiciary is to interpret ambiguous treaty and statutory provisions to the benefit of tribal interests ( Herrera v. Wyoming ). Congressional enactments rationally related to the fulfillment of that responsibility are constitutional ( Morton v. Mancari ). Despite this relative simplicity, Supreme Court justices regularly complain that federal Indian law precedents are difficult and even incompatible with the Constitution. Justice Clarence Thomas, known for regularly assailing federal Indian law precedents, decried in 2004 “ the confusion reflected in our precedent ” in a case involving the power of Congress to restore or reaffirm tribal nations’ inherent power to prosecute nonmember Indians. Justices Samuel Alito and Brett Kavanaugh repeatedly asserted during one oral argument that an equal protection challenge to the Indian Child Welfare Act (a 1978 federal law that seeks to keep Indian children with Indian families) raised “ difficult ” questions. (Kavanaugh even wrote separately to encourage a future vehicle to challenge aspects of the act .) They were joined by the federal government’s counsel, there to defend the statute, who nevertheless opined during a series of hypothetical scenarios from the court that these questions were “difficult to defend.” In fact, in the entire history of federal Indian affairs enactments, only two federal statutes have been struck down by the Supreme Court. One case, 1911’s Muskrat v. United States , taught in federal courts classes nationally, involved a strange statutory provision that allowed Cherokee tribal citizens to challenge an act of Congress only potentially impacting them, essentially authorizing the federal judiciary to render an advisory opinion. The second law, struck down twice by the court, allowed first the Interior Department and then tribal nations to confiscate “de minimus” property interests in Indian lands without compensation (see Hodel v. Irving and Babbitt v. Youpee ). And yet the litany of judges figuratively throwing up their hands in frustrated confusion continues. Perhaps it’s useful to separate the areas of confusion into three buckets. The first bucket is Congress. Thanks to the Indian commerce clause and to the exercise of the treaty power , Congress has first stab at making Indian affairs policy. In the history of federal Indian law and policy, Congressional policy has vacillated between two opposing poles. On one hand, from the founding until the late 1960s or early 1970s, Congressional policy more or less consistently favored the slow eradication of tribal governments and Indigenous land holdings. Congress wavered on how to go about this project. At times, Congress directly sought to scrub out whole regions of Indian country, as it did during the early- to mid-19th century’s Removal Era and the mid-20th century’s Termination Era . Mostly, Congress sought to create incredibly difficult conditions for tribal nations that might force them into oblivion, such as the Allotment and Assimilation Era of the latter half of the 19th century . In the 1970s until the current period, an era we call the Self-Determination Era, Congress has aggressively supported tribal interests – the polar opposite policy from removal, termination, and assimilation. Despite congressional consistency for the last 50 years, Thomas still has referred to Indian affairs policy by the inaccurate and questionable label, “ schizophrenic .” This is because such vacillating policies, for Thomas, create inconsistent precedents. The second bucket is jurisprudential. Recently, the court lamented the “confusion” in its precedents that have sustained congressional power without identifying the source or scope of that power (see Haaland v. Brackeen ). As far back as 1886, in United States v. Kagama , for example, the court described the relationship of Indian tribes to the national government as “an anomalous one, and of a complex character.” Perhaps the most infamous incidence of confusion was in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and United States v. Wheeler , decided 16 days apart in 1978. In the first case, the court concluded that inherent tribal powers can be divested through an “unspoken assumption” of federal, state, and tribal actors in the absence of an act of Congress regulating or abrogating that power, while in the second, the court concluded that tribal powers are retained absent explicit divestiture through an act of Congress. The third bucket of confusion arises from the court’s musings about the policy implications of its decisions. For example, complexities involving Indian country criminal jurisdiction long have perplexed the judiciary, with Congress doing little to better the situation (see Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation ). Luckily, tribes and local governments usually choose to reach agreement amongst themselves about how to police Indian country (see United States v. Cooley ). In recent years, the court has both identified jurisdictional complexity as a problem (see McGirt v. Oklahoma ’s dissent arguing against a shift from state to federal criminal jurisdiction on the Creek Reservation) and attempted to resolve it by acknowledging additional state authority over Indian country crime (see Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta ). All this despite the court’s documented lack of institutional capacity to make sound policy judgments in Indian affairs . Where does this leave us? Recently, scholars such as Michelle Bryan and Kekek Stark have taken up suggestion from Justices Neil Gorsuch and Thomas that the court’s Indian law precedents arising from an “ atmosphere ” of colonialism be reconsidered. Undoing some of the most odious precedents of the past that are inconsistent with the modern tribal self-determination would undoubtedly clear up most of the confusion. But it is my sense that those judges most likely to express frustration with the precedents may also be frustrated with the very idea of tribal sovereignty. So we may be stuck going in circles, with a federal Indian law that is both needlessly confusing and difficult. Throughout this series, I will attempt to further unpack how those difficulties have been addressed and how that circle might be squared.

SCOTUSblogSCOTUSblogMatthew L.M. Fletcher18 Sept

What AI misunderstands about the Supreme Court

Supreme Court justices are not (yet) using artificial intelligence in their work, apparently due to security concerns , but, in recent months, they’ve shown a growing interest in talking – and joking – about the rise of AI. Unknown block type "paywallDivider", specify a component for it in the `components.types` option Justice Amy Coney Barrett said she’s “sure” AI will be at the court “at some point in the future” while testifying before a House subcommittee in July. Justice Sonia Sotomayor urged law students “to master AI as a tool” during an April event in Alabama. And in March, Justice Samuel Alito teased an attorney known for his embrace of AI about whether the court should have a chatbot produce the court’s ruling. “Well, just out of curiosity, do you think we should ask Claude to decide this case?” Alito asked Adam Unikowsky during the March 30 oral argument in Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties . (Unikowsky responded “no” and that he “adhere[d] to the wise judgment” of the court.) Even before the justices made these comments, AI was playing a growing role in conversations about the Supreme Court, as attorneys increasingly publicly discussed their use of AI tools to prepare for argument and court watchers made AI-informed predictions of high-profile rulings. Indeed, in March, the topic of AI and the Supreme Court went somewhat viral, when prominent advocate Neal Katyal praised “Harvey,” the “bespoke AI” he used to prepare for oral argument in the tariffs case , and released a TED Talk about, among other things, Harvey’s support. “Harvey predicted many of the questions the Justices asked — sometimes almost word for word. Brilliant. Tireless. Occasionally insufferable,” Katyal wrote on X . While we shouldn’t expect the Supreme Court to unveil its own Harvey anytime soon, some justices have noted that the court is at least exploring various forms of AI assistance. “I know a lot of corporations – and maybe Congress too – are turning to AI to gain efficiencies. And we’re not there yet, because of the risks that AI could present, but it is something that we’re studying,” Barrett said during her congressional testimony in July. Justice Elena Kagan, who testified alongside Barrett, offered a similar assessment of the court’s efforts. “I think that this is a question that we’re looking at very closely in terms of what our rules should be going forward, what the best practices in this area are in terms of how justices, how their clerks, how their assistants use AI and make sure that it’s used appropriately but not used where it’s likely to create more dangers than anything else,” she said. Predicting the court As the court studies AI, AI systems will continue studying the court as users attempt to refine how products such as Chat GPT and Claude process – and predict – Supreme Court cases. A study released in July revealed that further refinement is needed, because top AI tools, such as Chat GPT and Claude, struggle to anticipate the nuances of the court’s rulings. “The models often recognized the broader controversy surrounding the litigation, but less consistently identified the narrower legal question that ultimately determined the Court’s alignment,” wrote researchers Hayley Stillwell of the University of Oklahoma College of Law and Sean Harrington of Arizona State University College of Law. They also “systematically overpredicted ideological division, revealing an important limitation in contemporary AI legal prediction.” As Stillwell and Harrington noted near the beginning of their study, there is already a history of using AI systems to predict what the Supreme Court will do. In this earlier research, AI tools were typically trained to apply a broad swath of data from the past – such as the justices’ historical voting patterns and the content of previous rulings – to current disputes. But in their study, Stillwell and Harrington wanted AI tools to act more like lawyers than historians or statisticians. They provided four large language models – Chat GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Grok 4 – with key documents associated with cases on the 2025-26 oral argument docket, including the parties’ briefs, the oral argument transcript, and the opinion below, and then “instructed the models to adopt the role of an ‘expert Supreme Court analyst.’” Using the case documents, as well as “general legal knowledge about constitutional doctrine, judicial behavior, and Supreme Court decision-making,” the AI systems were tasked with predicting, among other things, the court’s likely holding, the overall vote count, and the vote of each justice. After comparing the AI tools’ predictions to the court’s actual rulings, the researchers identified two notable issues with the tools’ understanding of the court’s work. First, as noted above, the AI systems overemphasized ideological division, predicting far more decisions pitting the six Republican-appointed justices against the three Democratic-appointed justices than was actually the case. “Although nearly forty-three percent of the Court’s merits decisions were unanimous, the models overwhelmingly anticipated 6-3 decisions,” Stillwell and Harrington wrote. They observed that the AI systems may have been misled by media coverage of the Supreme Court, from which the systems drew when building up their general legal knowledge. “Supreme Court decisions that receive the greatest public attention are often those framed as ideological confrontations between conservative and liberal Justices. By contrast, the Court’s many unanimous statutory, procedural, and technical decisions typically receive comparatively little sustained media coverage,” the researchers wrote. The second issue was that, while the AI systems “often recognized the broader controversy surrounding” a case, they “less consistently identified the narrower legal question that ultimately determined the Court’s alignment.” In other words, they struggled to predict which of the issues presented in a case would “drive the Court’s decision,” and, in turn, failed to recognize opportunities for a narrow holding to unite a broader coalition of justices. “Predicting judicial behavior requires more than identifying the legal questions presented by a case; it requires identifying the legal question the Court will ultimately regard as dispositive. That predictive judgment remains one of the most difficult aspects of Supreme Court advocacy—and, at least for now, one in which experienced lawyers continue to provide meaningful value” compared to AI tools, the researchers concluded. Defying expectations At least one Supreme Court justice would likely celebrate these results: Sotomayor, who, during her April 9 visit to the University of Alabama School of Law, described successful AI predictions as a problem for the Supreme Court. “It shows we’re way too predictable,” Sotomayor said, according to The Hill . “And we may not be stepping out of our normal thinking and opening our minds to new ideas enough if something like an AI system can actually predict with that high a level of success what the outcome will be.” Perhaps Sotomayor and other justices are hoping for a future in which AI systems support their work even as that work continues to defy expectations.

SCOTUSblogSCOTUSblogKelsey Dallas18 Sept